The Court Jurisdiction and Proceedings Transfer Act and the Hague Conference’s Judgments and Jurisdiction Projects by Joost, Blom
The Peter A. Allard School of Law 
Allard Research Commons 
Faculty Publications Faculty Publications 
2017 
The Court Jurisdiction and Proceedings Transfer Act and the 
Hague Conference’s Judgments and Jurisdiction Projects 
Blom Joost 
Allard School of Law at the University of British Columbia, blom@allard.ubc.ca 
Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.allard.ubc.ca/fac_pubs 
 Part of the International Law Commons, and the Jurisdiction Commons 
Citation Details 
Joost Blom, "The Court Jurisdiction and Proceedings Transfer Act and the Hague Conference’s 
Judgments and Jurisdiction Projects" ([forthcoming in 2017]) 55:1 Osgoode Hall LJ. 
This Working Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at Allard Research 
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Allard 
Research Commons. For more information, please contact petrovic@allard.ubc.ca, elim.wong@ubc.ca. 
  
1 
The	Court	Jurisdiction	and	Proceedings	Transfer	Act	and	the	Hague	Conference’s	
Judgments	and	Jurisdiction	Projects		
1. INTRODUCTION
The codification of the substantive law of jurisdiction in the CJPTA1 must be viewed not only from the 
perspective of Canadian private international law but also from that of international efforts to coordinate 
the law of jurisdiction and foreign judgments. Most prominent among these are the projects of the Hague 
Conference on Private International Law. These include a failed attempt at a convention to deal both with 
jurisdiction and with foreign judgments (1999-2001); a promulgated convention on Choice of Court 
Agreements (2005); a new attempt, currently under way, to develop a convention on recognition and 
enforcement of foreign judgments without any direct rules on jurisdiction; and a foreshadowed attempt to 
develop a separate convention with direct rules on jurisdiction. A brief history of these evolutions is 
necessary.  
The earliest attempt to develop a comprehensive convention on the recognition and enforcement of civil 
judgments began with a decision of the Conference in 19602 and culminated in the Convention of 1 
February 1971 on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial 
Matters.3 This convention attracted no adherents, partly because of its complexity and partly because the 
European countries had developed the Brussels Convention,4 which successfully covered the field within 
the European Communities.  
In May 1992 the United States proposed to the Hague Conference that it initiate a new project on the 
recognition and enforcement of civil judgments, contrasting the success of the 1958 New York 
Convention on the enforcement of arbitral awards with the absence of any international agreement on 
1 The Uniform Court Jurisdiction and Proceedings Transfer Act promulgated by the Uniform Law Conference 
in 1994 has been enacted in three provinces: Court Jurisdiction and Proceedings Transfer Act, SBC 2003, c 28 
[CJPTA (BC)] (in force 4 May 2006); Court Jurisdiction and Proceedings Transfer Act, SNS 2003 (2d Sess), c 
2 [CJPTA (NS)] (in force 1 June 2008); Court Jurisdiction and Proceedings Transfer Act, SS 1997, c C-41.1 
[CJPTA (SK)] (in force 1 March 2004). The acts differ slightly. Yukon Territory has enacted it but not brought 
it into force: Court Jurisdiction and Proceedings Transfer Act, SY 2000, c 7. See Vaughan Black, Stephen GA 
Pitel & Michael Sobkin, Statutory Jurisdiction: An Analysis of the Court Jurisdiction and Proceedings 
Transfer Act (Toronto: Carswell, 2012).  
2 Hague Conference on Private International Law, Preliminary Document No 7, April 1997, International 
Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, report drawn up by Catherine 
Kessedjian, online: Hague Conference on Private International Law <https://assets.hcch.net/docs/76852ce3-
a967-42e4-94f5-24be4289d1e5.pdf> [Kessedjian report], para 3.  
3 Online: Hague Conference on Private International Law 
<https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/full-text/?cid=78>. 
4 According to the Kessedjian report, supra note 2, para 7, citing the Permanent Bureau’s Preliminary Document 
No 17 of May 1992, the Brussels Convention built to a large extent on the Hague Convention and was 
negotiated in part by the same persons. The Lugano Convention extended the Brussels regime to the European 
Free Trade Area.  
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enforcing civil judgments.5 The Hague Conference took up this proposal. From the outset there were 
shifting and conflicting views on whether the convention should include rules, not only on foreign 
judgments, but also on the grounds on which courts in states that were parties to the convention must or 
must not take jurisdiction.  
The United States’ initial proposal dealt with this issue.6 It suggested that the Brussels Convention model 
was a valuable one but a closed list of acceptable bases for jurisdiction might not attract broad enough 
support outside Western Europe. Rather than having to choose between a traité simple, dealing with 
recognition and enforcement of judgments only, and a traité double, mandating as well the jurisdictional 
grounds that states must follow, the Conference should consider the third option of a traité mixte, which 
could mandate some jurisdictional grounds (a “white list”), exclude others as exorbitant grounds (a “black 
list”), and leave states free to use or not use jurisdictional grounds that were not on either list (a “gray 
zone”).7  
The Permanent Bureau of the Hague Conference first took the view that efforts should be directed at a 
traité simple, because any attempt to codify jurisdictional grounds would run up against the problem that 
parties to the Brussels and Lugano Conventions would be very reluctant to subscribe to any jurisdictional 
regime that departed significantly from the the European one.8 Things moved along and in 1996 the 
Conference definitively decided to look at “the question of jurisdiction, and recognition and enforcement 
of foreign judgments in civil and commercial matters”.9 A year later, the Permanent Bureau had swung 
around to insisting that “the issue is much more one of direct jurisdiction than of the recognition and 
enforcement of judgments”.10 From then on the Conference’s efforts were directed at producing at least a 
traité mixte rather than just a traité simple.  
                                                      
5  Letter from the Legal Advisor to the Secretary of State to the Secretary General of the Hague Conference on 
Private International Law, 5 May 1992, online: State Department of the United States 
<http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/65973.pdf>. The approach to the Hague Conference came after 
informal discussions that Arthur von Mehren had in 1991 with representatives of the Netherlands and the 
United Kingdom, to explore possibly negotiating a foreign judgments treaty between the United States and the 
EC-EFTA member states. The consensus was that working on a Hague Convention was a more promising 
avenue. See Arthur T von Mehren, “Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments: A New Approach for 
the Hague Conference?” (1994) 57 L & Contemp Prob 271 at 281-82.  
6  Letter from the Legal Advisor, ibid.  
7  The mixed convention option was favoured by von Mehren, supra note 5 at 287. He continued to believe in it 
at the time when negotiations on it were going badly: “Drafting a Convention on International Jurisdiction and 
the Effects of Foreign Judgments Acceptable World-Wide: Can the Hague Conference Project Succeed?” 
(2001) 49 Am J Comp L 19. On the typology of judgment conventions, suggesting there are actually nine 
types, see Ralf Michaels, “Some Fundamental Jurisdictional Conceptions as Applied to Judgment 
Conventions”, in Eckart Gottschalk et al, Conflict of Laws in a Globalized World (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007) 29.  
8  “Some Reflections of the Permanent Bureau on a general convention on enforcement of judgments”, 
Preliminary Document No 17 of May 1992, online: Hague Conference on Private International Law 
<https://assets.hcch.net/docs/bd6dcaab-b2a4-4255-84ec-eca3b7233588.pdf> at paras 16-19.  
9  Hague Conference on Private International Law, Final Act of the Eighteenth Session (1996), online: Hague 
Conference on Private International Law <https://assets.hcch.net/docs/63159a78-60af-43a4-be35-
1f58a22645c1.pdf> at 47.  
10  Kessedjian report, supra note 2, para 8 [footnotes omitted].  
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In 1999 a Special Commission had developed a preliminary draft convention, which was the subject of an 
explanatory report by Peter Nygh and Fausto Pocar.11 (It is one of four drafts that I will be referring to in 
this paper; I will refer to this one as the “1999 Hague draft”.) At the 2001 Diplomatic Conference of the 
Hague Conference, Commission II reworked the draft. The product of its efforts (the “2001 Hague 
Draft”12) showed all too clearly the tensions between enthusiasts for the Brussels model and other 
countries, especially the United States, with very different, generally broader, jurisdictional grounds.13 
Brackets, alternative versions and variant versions had proliferated like weeds.  
Efforts to move things forward were unsuccessful. In 2003 the Conference narrowed the focus of the 
project to one relatively uncontroversial jurisdictional principle, which was consent to jurisdiction by 
agreement. This resulted in the Hague Convention of 30 June 2005 on Choice of Court Agreements.14 The 
Choice of Court Convention is in force; the European Union, Mexico and Singapore have become parties 
to it.15 Because defining jurisdiction was not the main issue,16 the convention’s importance lies more in 
                                                      
11  The draft text and the report are both in Preliminary Document No 11 (August 2000), online: Hague 
Conference on Private International Law <https://assets.hcch.net/docs/638883f3-0c0a-46c6-b646-
7a099d9bd95e.pdf>. I will refer to the draft text as the “1999 Hague draft” (it was adopted by a Special 
Commission in 1999). For a Canadian view at the time, see Vaughan Black, “Commodifying Justice for Global 
Free Trade: The Proposed Hague Judgments Convention” (2000) 38 Osgoode Hall LJ 237.  
12  Online: Hague Conference on Private International Law, Commission II, Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments 
in Civil and Commercial Matters, Nineteenth Session, Summary of the Outcome of the Discussion in 
Commission II of the First Part of the Diplomatic Conference 6-20 June 2001: Interim Text, online: Hague 
Conference on Private International Law <https://assets.hcch.net/docs/e172ab52-e2de-4e40-9051-
11aee7c7be67.pdf>[2001 Hague draft].  
13  Although not always broader. Brussels grounds of jurisdiction, especially assumed jurisdiction in relation to 
contracts and torts, extend to some cases in which American law would have due process concerns; see Ronald 
A Brand, “Due Process, Jurisdiction and a Hague Judgments Convention” (1999) 60 U Pitts L Rev 661. On the 
impasse generally, see John J Barceló III & Kevin M Clermont, A Global Law of Jurisdiction and Judgments: 
Lessons from The Hague (The Hague: Kluwer, 2002); Gralf-Peter Calliess, “Value-added Norms, Local 
Litigation, and Global Enforcement: Why the Brussels Philosophy Failed in The Hague” (2004), 5 German LJ 
1489; William E O’Brian Jr, “The Hague Convention on Jurisdiction and Judgments: The Way Forward” 
(2003) 66 MLR 491; Justyna Regan, “Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments — A Second 
Attempt in The Hague?” (2015) 14 Richmond J Global L & Bus 63 at 64-71. Arthur von Mehren, writing in 
the midst of the impasse, attributed it in significant measure to “a fundamental discordance between the views 
of the United States and of most, perhaps all, European Union States respecting the role of adjudication in 
contemporary society”: von Mehren, supra note 7 at 195.  
14  Online: Hague Conference on Private International Law 
<https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/specialised-sections/choice-of-court> [Choice of Court 
Convention].  
15  Status table, online: Hague Conference on Private International Law 
<https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/status-table/?cid=98>. As the time of writing the United 
States and Ukraine had signed but not yet ratified.  
16  Although some Canadian common law jurisdictional rules would change if Canada becomes a party. Most 
notably, “strong cause” would no longer be a ground for taking jurisdiction despite the clause. Art 6 limits the 
ability to take jurisdiction in the face of an exclusive contractual choice of another court. If the choice of court 
agreement is contractually valid, taking jurisdiction is only possible if giving effect to the agreement would 
“lead to a manifest injustice or would be manifestly contrary to public policy” of the forum, or the agreement 
cannot be reasonably performed, or the chosen court will not hear the case (para (c)-(e), respectively). See 
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the provisions setting out the conditions of, and defences to, recognition and enforcement of a judgment 
of the chosen court. Many of those provisions have been carried over, mutatis mutandis, into the current 
project on a general convention on the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial 
matters.  
The current project dates from 2011, when, at the instigation of the Permanent Bureau, the Hague 
Conference appointed an Experts’ Group to consider further work on a judgments project. That group 
recommended that work be undertaken on a recognition and enforcement convention, including 
jurisdictional filters. This recommendation led to a Working Group, which in 2015 produced a proposed 
draft text of a convention.17 The Working Group’s draft went to a Special Commission that met in June 
2016 and reworked it. The result was published as the Special Commission’s “2016 Preliminary Draft 
Convention”.18 The Special Commission met again and revised the 2016 draft into the “February 2017 
Draft Convention”,19 which is the latest indication of what a convention might look like. Confidence 
seems high that a final version can be achieved. The Special Commission has tentatively scheduled a third 
session in November 2017 and it has recommended that a Diplomatic Conference may be convened 
towards the end of 2018 or early 2019.20  
So the prospects seem good that a traité simple form of convention will emerge, with “jurisdictional 
filters” but no direct rules on taking jurisdiction. Nevertheless, despite the fiasco of 1999-2001, the 
ambition to create a jurisdiction convention lives on. The Council of the Hague Conference resolved  in 
March 2016 that, once the Special Commission had drawn up a draft recognition and enforcement 
convention, the Experts’ Group would be convened again, this time to consider “matters relating to direct 
                                                                                                                                                                              
Vaughan Black, “Hague Convention Choice of Court Agreement and the Common Law 2007”, online: 
Uniform Law Conference of Canada <http://www.ulcc.ca/en/annual-meetings/216-2007-charlottetown-
pe/civil-section-documents/566-hague-convention-choice-of-court-agreement-and-the-common-law-2007> at 
paras 29-31. See also H Scott Fairley & John Archibald, “After The Hague: Some Thoughts on the Impact on 
Canadian Law of the Convention on Choice of Court Agreements” (2006), 12 ILSA J Int’l & Comp L 417. 
17  Hague Conference on Private International Law, Preliminary Document No 2, April 2016, includes the text of 
the Working Group draft and the Permanent Bureau’s Explanatory Note Providing Background on the 
Proposed Draft Text and Identifying Outstanding Issues, online (as part of a set of files labeled 2016 Special 
Commission Documentation): Hague Conference on Private International Law, 
<https://www.hcch.net/en/projects/legislative-projects/judgments/special-commission1>. I will refer to the 
draft text as “Working Group draft” and the explanatory note as “April 2016 Explanatory Note”.  
18  Hague Conference on Private International Law, Special Commission on the Recognition and Enforcement of 
Foreign Judgments, 2016 Preliminary Draft Convention, online: Hague Conference on Private International 
Law <https://assets.hcch.net/docs/42a96b27-11fa-49f9-8e48-a82245aff1a6.pdf> [2016 Hague draft].   
19  Hague Conference on Private International Law, Special Commission on the Recognition and Enforcement of 
Foreign Judgments, February 2017 Draft Convention, online: Hague Conference on Private International Law 
< https://assets.hcch.net/docs/d6f58225-0427-4a65-8f8b-180e79cafdbb.pdf> [February 2017 Hague draft]. The 
major portion of this draft is included as an appendix to this paper.  
20  Hague Conference on Private International Law, Council on General Affairs and Policy of the Conference (14-
16 March 2017), Conclusions and Recommendations Adopted by the Council, online: Hague Conference on 
Private International Law < https://assets.hcch.net/docs/77326cfb-ff7e-401a-b0e8-2de9efa1c7f6.pdf > at para 
5.  
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jurisdiction (including exorbitant grounds and lis pendens / declining jurisdiction)” with a view to 
“preparing an additional instrument”.21 The Council reiterated this plan in March 2017.22  
Whether anything comes of such further consideration seems highly uncertain. If a convention along the 
lines of the February 2017 Hague draft does materialize and is reasonably widely adopted, it is far from 
clear how much value a convention on “direct jurisdiction” would add to the international litigation 
system.23 If a judgments convention does not materialize or — probably the greater risk — is not widely 
taken up, it is hard to see a jurisdiction convention, which we know from experience is a much greater 
challenge, being viable at all.  
2. THE CJPTA AND THE HAGUE PROJECTS  
The main question about the CJPTA and the Hague projects is whether the CJPTA’s rules might cause 
difficulty in the event that Canada becomes a party to the judgments convention currently being 
negotiated. This convention is already taking fairly clear shape, and, as noted, the chances that the 
negotiations will succeed seem good. If they do, and if the convention is adopted by Canada (probably 
province by province24) and by a number of Canada’s trading partners, the relationship between the 
CJPTA regime and the jurisdictional criteria in the convention will become a matter of great practical 
importance.  
A separate Hague jurisdiction convention is a remoter prospect. Such a convention may one day see the 
light of day, but the jurisdictional principles in the 1999 and 2001 drafts elicited little consensus at the 
time, and it is doubtful whether they would elicit any more now. If a new jurisdiction convention 
eventually emerges, it is almost certainly going to look very different from these drafts. Nevertheless, I 
                                                      
21  Hague Conference on Private International Law, Council on General Affairs and Policy of the Conference (15-
17 March 2016), Conclusions and Recommendations Adopted by the Council, online: Hague Conference on 
Private International Law <https://assets.hcch.net/docs/679bd42c-f974-461a-8e1a-31e1b51eda10.pdf> at para 
13. The Council “confirmed that this is a priority project” (ibid at para 14).   
22  Hague Conference on Private International Law, Council on General Affairs and Policy of the Conference (14-
16 March 2017), Conclusions and Recommendations Adopted by the Council, supra note 20 at para. 7.  
23  If litigants know what jurisdictional grounds entitle an eventual judgment to be recognized or enforced in 
another country, and having the judgment recognized or enforced matters to them, their choice of where to 
litigate is accordingly circumscribed. There might still be jurisdictional contests and manoeuvring because 
their could be more than one forum that complies with the recognition rules (e.g., to take two from the 
February 2017 Hague draft, the defendant’s habitual residence and  the place where the defendant’s tortious 
conduct took place). Here a separate jurisdiction convention might help by, for instance, providing a lis 
pendens rule. Where parties do not care about whether an eventual judgment will be enforceable, the range of 
possible jurisdictional struggles is larger, and a jurisdiction convention in principle would help by reining in 
broad jurisdictional rules and providing an agreed set of rules to deal with multiple forums and parallel 
proceedings. The benefits from doing all that, however, are much harder to evaluate than the benefits from an 
agreed set of rules for recognizing and enforcing judgments. One reason is that it is hard to assess how 
successfully, on the whole, the problem of competing jurisdictions is already addressed through the current 
decentralized international system, in which each country controls its own courts’ ability to take or decline 
jurisdiction if there are other available forums.  
24  February 2017 Hague draft, art 28, the now familiar “federal state clause” that enables a state to declare that 
the convention extends to all its territorial units or only to some of them. The declaration to limit application to 
certain units must be made when the state becomes a party but may be modified subsequently.  
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have referred here and there to what was in the 1999 and 2001 Hague drafts, as glimpses of what might 
possibly be included in such a convention.  
The jurisdictional grounds approved in the February 2017 Hague draft are a relatively short list, which is 
not surprising, given that the participants in the Special Commission, from a wide range of countries, 
could all agree on them. A judgment from a court that had jurisdiction on one of these grounds would 
have to be recognized or enforced. The convention’s regime would not be exclusive; a state would be free 
to have its courts recognize judgments on jurisdictional grounds accepted in its national recognition and 
enforcement rules even if those judgments did not qualify under the convention.25 The convention would 
apply only if both the state of origin and the requested state were parties to the convention.26  
3. SUBJECT MATTER ISSUES  
Before looking in detail at how the CJPTA compares with the jurisdictional provisions in the February 
2017 Hague draft, it is worth noting some aspects of the Hague regime relating to subject matter.  
The CJPTA has no provisions that exclude any subject matter from its scope, but some subject matters are 
indirectly excluded because court jurisdiction in relation to them is dealt with in another statute, whether 
provincial or federal.27 The scope of the February 2017 Hague draft, as of the Hague project from the 
beginning,  is limited to “civil or commercial matters”.28 Revenue matters are expressly excluded as not 
being civil or commercial.29 A fairly long list of subject matters that are definitely or arguably civil or 
commercial are also excluded. The details are not material for the present purpose. Among others, they 
embrace the status and capacity of natural persons, family matters, succession, insolvency, carriage of 
passengers and goods, and the validity, nullity or dissolution of corporations and other entities. 30 A 
notable exclusion is defamation,31 because it implicates freedom of expression and may have 
constitutional implications.32  
The February 2017 Hague draft also makes some matters subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of one state. 
These by and large correspond to matters that Canadian common law rules also regard as within one 
country’s exclusive jurisdiction. The Moçambique rule is present, though in a narrower form. Only courts 
                                                      
25  February 2017 Hague draft, supra note 19, art 17.  
26  Ibid, art 1(2).  
27  CJPTA (BC), supra note 1, s 12. I am using the BC version of the CJPTA as representative of all three.  
28  February 2017 Hague draft, supra note 19, art 1(1).  
29  Ibid, art 1(1).  
30  See ibid, art 2(1).  
31  Ibid, art 2(1)(k). The same provision has a bracketed extension to judgments on privacy.  
32  As it is put in the April 2016 Explanatory Note, supra note 17, para 38. Although it is not referred to in so 
many words, including defamation would have run head-on into the United States’ 2010 SPEECH Act 
[Securing the Protection of our Enduring and Established Constitutional Heritage Act], 28 USC § 4102.  
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in the country where an immovable is situated can rule directly on rights in rem in the immovable,33 but 
that rule does not extend to personal claims relating to such property.34  
An area in which the Special Commission reached no consensus in February 2017 was how to deal with 
judgments on intellectual property (IP) rights. The February 2017 draft, unlike the 2016 draft, has a 
bracketed provision that would exclude judgments on IP rights from the scope of the convention 
altogether, possibly subject to an exception, separately bracketed, for judgments based on copyright or 
other non-registered rights.35 There is a further bracketed provision that would exclude the enforcement of 
non-monetary judgments in IP matters even if monetary damage awards in such matters were within the 
convention.36 .  
Alternative provisions assume that some or all IP judgments will be included in the convention’s scope. 
They grapple with the issue of territoriality. It has long been the general view that jurisdiction in an 
infringement action, or some other action in which the validity of the IP right is in issue, is strictly 
territorial in the sense that only the state whose IP right is in question can adjudicate on the validity or 
infringement of the right. The current of opinion has moved away from this position in relation to 
copyright and other rights that do not depend on registration, because there is no impingement, even 
arguably, on the state’s sovereignty by a foreign court’s deciding on such rights.37 Because a foreign 
decision on a registered right arguably does involve the sovereignty of the state of registration, the 
territoriality principle remains more solidly in place— but not unchallengeably so —for rights like patents 
and trademarks, which mostly do depend on registration.38  
The 2016 Hague draft would have applied the territoriality principle to judgments ruling on the 
registration or validity of a registered right.39 They would be enforceable under the convention if and only 
if they came from a court in the country of registration.40 Thus there would be an obligation not to enforce 
                                                      
33  Ibid, art 6(b). Art 6(c) is a special rule about judgments ruling on a tenancy of immovable property for a period 
of more than six months. The court of the situs has exclusive jurisdiction under the convention only if the situs 
is in a contracting state and the law of that state give its own courts exclusive jurisdiction.  
34  April 2016 Explanatory Note, supra note 17, para 156.  
35  February 2017 Hague draft, supra note 19, art 2(l)(l) (the blanket exclusion and the copyright inclusion are 
separately bracketed). See also infra note 38 and accompanying text.  
36  February 2017 Hague draft, ibid, art 12.  
37  Lucasfilm Ltd v Ainsworth, [2011] UKSC 39, [2012] 1 AC 208. The issue has not come up yet in a Canadian 
case. See, however, Geophysical Service Inc v Jebco Seismic UK Ltd, 2016 ABQB 402 at para 24: “It is 
difficult to contemplate how a forum outside of Canada would ever be an appropriate forum for the 
consideration and application of Canadian copyright law.”  
38  The distinction between the territorial implications of the two types of IP right is why art 2(1)(l) (supra note 
35) contemplates that the convention might include judgments on copyright and other non-registered rights 
even if it otherwise excludes IP rights from its scope. 
39  “Ruling on” would presumably include deciding on the validity of the right as part of a judgment for 
infringement.  
40  Under another bracketed provision in the February 2017 Hague draft, art 5(1)(k), a judgment of the state of 
registration for infringement of a registered patent, trademark or other listed intellectual property right would 
be enforceable without any other basis of jurisdiction being present, but the draft added (compared with 2016) 
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judgments from a country other than that of registration even if one of the other grounds of jurisdiction 
was present, like the defendant’s habitual residence in that country.41 However, in its February 2017 draft 
the Special Commission put brackets around this provision, raising the possibility that judgments from 
states other than that of registration might be encompassed in the obligation to enforce.42 In the case of 
copyright and other non-registered rights (assuming they were not excluded from the convention’s scope), 
a judgment based on any of the convention’s jurisdictional grounds would be enforceable, regardless of 
whether the copyright or other right in question was governed by the law of the state of origin or a 
different state.43  
4. TERRITORIAL COMPETENCE  
4.1 General 
In this part of the paper I will review the various heads of territorial competence under the CJPTA from 
the point of view of how far they correspond to the jurisdictional criteria that feature in the February 2017 
Hague draft. As already mentioned, I will also make occasional comparisons to the “direct jurisdiction” 
provisions in the 1999 and 2001 Hague drafts.  
A point that needs to be made at the outset is that the rules for domestic jurisdiction, which is what the 
CJPTA deals with, need not correspond to the rules that determine the jurisdiction of a foreign court for 
the purpose of foreign judgments, which is what the Hague judgments convention would deal with. The 
law may allow domestic courts to take jurisdiction on  a ground that would not be recognized as giving a 
foreign court jurisdiction. (The reverse would not normally be true.) This is especially so if the domestic 
jurisdictional system includes a discretion to decline jurisdiction, on forum non conveniens or other 
grounds. If the exercise of jurisdiction is tempered by such a discretion, the grounds for jurisdiction can 
be more broadly drawn. But in the case of foreign judgments, where there is typically no discretion to 
                                                                                                                                                                              
the qualification, itself separately bracketed, “unless the defendant has not acted in that State [the state of 
registration] to initiate or further the infringement, or their activity cannot reasonably be seen as having been 
targeted at that State”. The latter proviso probably reflects United States due process concerns if jurisdiction is 
based solely on the fact that the right infringed was that of the state of origin.  
41  2016 Hague draft, supra note 18, art 6(a). Enforcement under national law would not be an option because the 
exclusive jurisdiction provisions in art 6 would apply even if national law was to the contrary (art 16 of the 
2016 draft, carried forward into art 17 of the February 2017 draft, supra note 19).  
42  February 2017 Hague draft, ibid, art 6(a). It is clear that a judgment from outside the country of registration 
could not have in rem effects, such as invalidating the registration, but it could be binding between the parties 
in personam.  
43  Art 6(a) of the February 2017 Hague draft, referred to supra note 41, is limited to judgments on IP rights that 
are required to be granted or registered, which would not apply to copyright or other unregistered rights. 
However, in art 7(1)(g) (bracketed), the draft would allow states optionally to refuse to enforce a judgment for 
infringement of an IP right if the court applied to that right a law other than the law governing the right. The 
fact that the law of the state of origin governed the right in question would be a distinct head of jurisdiction 
under two bracketed provisions in the February 2017 Hague draft, supra note 19, art 5(1)(l) and (m), which 
deal with judgments on the ownership or subsistence (para (l)) or infringement (para (m)) of copyright or other 
non-registered rights. As with judgments for infringement of registered rights (see supra note 40), there is a 
separately bracketed qualification in para (m) that would exclude infringement judgments in which the 
defendant did not act in, or direct its activities towards, the state in question.  
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decline to recognize or enforce, it may be appropriate to frame the grounds for the foreign court’s 
jurisdiction more narrowly.44  
With very few exceptions, the CJPTA grounds for territorial competence are broader than the 
corresponding jurisdictional grounds in the Hague drafts. The CJPTA generally tracks the Canadian 
common law as it stood in the early 1990s, when the Uniform Law Conference of Canada prepared the 
act. The common law on jurisdiction has since evolved in two ways. First, in assumed jurisdiction, 
meaning in personam jurisdiction as against a defendant who is not present in the province,45 Canadian 
law, in Club Resorts,46  adopted the analytical device of presumptive connecting factors (PCFs). Second, 
in presence-based jurisdiction, the Supreme Court of Canada, in Chevron,47 clarified that the evolution of 
the Canadian common law in the last 25 years has left untouched the common law rule that mere presence 
is enough to found jurisdiction. From this it follows that an individual’s presence in the province need not 
meet any test of substantiality. It also follows that, as was specifically held in Chevron, a corporation’s 
constructive presence, through carrying on business in the province, is fully equivalent to the physical 
presence of an individual. It supports jurisdiction in any claim against the corporation, regardless of 
whether the claim has anything to do with the defendant’s activities in the province.  
These developments have, if anything, opened up something of a gap between the common law and the 
CJPTA, leaving the CJPTA sitting closer to the Hague standards than the Canadian common law now 
does. In cases of assumed jurisdiction, common law PCFs are now in some respects much wider than the 
presumed real and substantial connections listed in the CJPTA.48 True, the expansive tendency of the 
common law may filter into the CJPTA via the use of the “residual” real and substantial connection. 
However, the “residual” connection is an avenue that courts in the CJPTA provinces have not been 
inclined to open up much until now, and they will not necessarily change this stance just because, in the 
non-CJPTA provinces, some PCFs are more liberal than the CJPTA presumptions.49  
In cases of presence-based jurisdiction, a clear gap exists in relation to individuals because the CJPTA 
chose to make ordinary residence, rather than presence, the test. There is no significant gap as far as 
                                                      
44  In theory Canadian law since 1990 has treated the scope of domestic jurisdiction and the scope of a foreign 
court’s jurisdiction as correlatives by applying the “real and substantial connection” criterion to both: 
Morguard Investments Ltd v De Savoye, [1990] 3 SCR 1077 at 1094; Beals v Saldanha, 2003 SCC 72, [2003] 
3 SCR 416 at paras 37-38, 84, 202. The principle of correlativity applies in a system constructed that like that 
of the European Brussels I Regulation (recast), Reg (EU) No 1215/2012. It is not axiomatic in relation to a 
common law system, and the difficulties posed by it have never been fully examined by Canadian courts.  
45  The distinction between assumed and presence-based jurisdiction was stressed in Chevron Corp v Yaiguaje, 
2015 SCC 42 at para 81, [2015] 3 SCR 69 [Chevron].  
46  Club Resorts Ltd v Van Breda, 2012 SCC 17, [2012] 1 SCR 572 [Club Resorts].  
47  Chevron, supra note 45.  
48  For example, the PCF, for the purpose of a tort claim, that the claim is connected with a contract that was made 
in the province. This PCF was applied in Lapointe Rosenstein Marchand Melançon LLP v Cassels Brock & 
Blackwell LLP, 2016 SCC 30 [Lapointe]. This case actually relied on the presumptive connecting factor of a 
contract made in the jurisdiction as supporting jurisdiction in a tort action, but the result suggests the court may 
lean in favour a retention of “necessary or proper party” as a ground for jurisdiction simpliciter. One decision 
has already accepted it as a PCF: Geophysical Service Inc v Arcis Seismic Solutions Corp, 2015 ABQB 88, 20 
Alta LR (6th) 112.  
49  Cf the reluctance to import the Muscutt factors: Laxton v Jurem Anstalt, 2011 BCCA 212, 334 DLR (4th) 76.  
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claims against a corporation are concerned, because the CJPTA’s definition of ordinary residence for a 
corporation50 encompassed the common law criterion of carrying on business in the province, later 
affirmed in Chevron.  
In reviewing the CJPTA criteria for territorial competence, I have indicated at the start of each discussion 
whether I think a judgment of a Canadian court that took jurisdiction on that ground would be “Hague 
compliant” in the sense of meeting the jurisdictional standards in the February 2017 Hague draft. The 
answer usually is sometimes, in a few cases it is always, and in some cases it is never.  
4.2 Consent 
4.2.1 Defendant sued on counterclaim 
Sometimes Hague compliant. The CJPTA gives territorial competence whenever the defendant is sued 
on a counterclaim to a proceeding in which that person is plaintiff.51 The February 2017 Hague draft 
qualifies the enforceability of a judgment on such a counterclaim. To the extent that the counterclaim 
succeeded, the judgment is enforceable only if the counterclaim arose out of the same transaction or 
occurrence as the claim.52 This is a qualification not present in the CJPTA. Whether a counterclaim can be 
brought if it arises out of an unrelated transaction depends on the local rules. It does appear likely that 
some counterclaims that would fit under the CJPTA rule would not meet the “same transaction or 
occurrence” test, as when the defendant in a contract action counterclaims based on an unrelated debt that 
the plaintiff owes the defendant.  
4.2.2 Submission in the course of proceedings 
Sometimes Hague compliant. The expression used in the CJPTA provision53 is that the defendant 
“submits to the court’s jurisdiction” in the course of the proceeding. This must be compared with the 
combination of two jurisdictional grounds in the February 2017 Hague draft. One says, “expressly 
consented to the jurisdiction of the court of origin in the course of the proceedings”.54 This is narrower 
than the CJPTA provision because submission in the Canadian sense can take place by conduct that 
implicitly accepts the jurisdiction of the court without clearly qualifying as “express consent”. The Hague 
grounds also include one that the Special Commission added to the Working Group’s draft in 201655 and 
                                                      
50  CJPTA (BC), supra note 1, s 7(c). There may be nuances; at common law someone like an incorporated 
consultant could carry on business in the jurisdiction without necessarily having a fixed place of business in the 
jurisdiction. On the other hand, the court in Chevron, supra note 45 at para 85, emphasized that courts 
consistently found “maintenance of physical business premises to be a compelling jurisdictional factor”.  
51  CJPTA (BC), ibid, s 3(a).  
52  February 2017 Hague draft, supra note 19, art 5(1)(o). To the extent that it failed, it must be recognized unless 
the law of the state of origin required the counterclaim to be filed in order to avoid preclusion; ibid.  
53  CJPTA(BC), s 3(b).  
54  February 2017 Hague draft, supra note 19, art 5(1)(e).  
55  2016 Hague draft, supra note 18, art 5(1)(f).  
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revised in February 2017.56 This is that the defendant “argued on the merits before the court of origin 
without contesting jurisdiction within the timeframe provided in the law of the State of origin, unless it is 
evident that an objection to jurisdiction or to the exercise of jurisdiction would not have succeeded under 
that law”.57 The expression “argued on the merits” covers most of the situations in which, according to the 
Canadian case law, a defendant implicitly accepts jurisdiction, but perhaps not all of them.58 The very 
significant qualification that arguing on the merits does not give the court jurisdiction if the defendant had 
no viable way to contest jurisdiction has no equivalent in Canadian law.  
It is worth noting that the February 2017 Hague draft would restrict the “express consent” ground to 
consent that “was addressed to the court, orally or in writing”, if the person said to be bound by the 
judgment is a consumer being sued on a consumer contract or an employee being sued on an employment 
contract.59 
4.2.3 Agreement that the court has jurisdiction 
To avoid overlap between the 2005 Choice of Court Convention and the general judgments convention, 
the February 2017 Hague draft does not deal with submission under an exclusive choice of court 
agreement, which is the preserve of the 2005 convention.60 Any agreement designating a court or courts 
of one contracting state is deemed to be exclusive unless the parties expressly provide otherwise.61 A 
court designated in a valid exclusive choice of court agreement has jurisdiction and cannot decline it in 
favour of a court in another state.62 A judgment of a court that is exclusively chosen must be recognized 
and enforced,63 subject only to fairly standard defences such as fraud and public policy.64  
Where jurisdiction was taken on the basis of a non-exclusive choice of court agreement, recognition and 
enforcement are mandatory under the Choice of Court Convention only if both the state of origin and the 
requested state have made declarations that they are prepared to recognize and enforce judgments where 
jurisdiction is taken on such a basis.65 A state that signs on to the proposed judgments convention will, 
however, bind itself to enforce a judgment “given by a court designated in an agreement concluded or 
                                                      
56  February 2017 Hague draft, supra note 19, art 5(1)(f). The 2016 version, which was in brackets, used “entered 
an appearance” rather than “argued on the merits”.  
57  February 2017 Hague draft, ibid, art 5(1)(f).  
58  As when the defendant writes the court a letter responding to the notice of the proceeding, as the Thivys did in 
Beals v Saldanha, 2003 SCC 72, [2003] 3 SCR 416, which LeBel J said at para 147 was attornment.  
59  February 2017 Hague draft, supra note 19, art 5(2)(a).  
60  Choice of Court Convention, supra note 14, art 1(1).  
61  Ibid, art 3(b).  
62  Ibid, art 5(1)-(2).  
63  Ibid, art 8(1).  
64  Ibid, art 9.  
65  Ibid, art 22.  
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documented in writing . . . other than an exclusive choice of court agreement”.66 This supplement to the 
Choice of Court Convention is consistent with the principle of consent, which the CJPTA also embodies 
when it says that a court has territorial competence if “there is an agreement between the plaintiff and [the 
defendant] to the effect that the court has jurisdiction in the proceeding”.67  
4.3 Ordinary residence 
4.3.1 Individuals 
Always Hague compliant. Both ordinary residence, the CJPTA test,68 and habitual residence, the Hague 
test,69 have been applied for many years by Canadian courts, especially in family matters, and they are 
generally treated as equivalent. Assuming that they are, a judgment in any case in which territorial 
competence was based on an individual’s ordinary residence will comply with the habitual residence 
criterion in the February 2017 Hague draft.  
The 1999 Hague draft (the mixed convention) also used habitual residence as the basic jurisdictional 
test,70 and specifically prohibited jurisdiction based on the defendant’s temporary residence or presence in 
the state.71  The negotiations the following year showed disagreement on whether the term used should be 
residence or habitual residence,72 and in case residence were to be chosen, a bracketed provision was 
inserted to select the state of principal residence if there was one.73  
4.3.2 Corporations and other entities  
Sometimes Hague compliant. The CJPTA follows the common law tradition of treating a corporation as 
present in the province if it does business or has an agent for service there. Because the Hague model, 
following the civil law pattern, makes habitual residence, not presence, the basic ground for personal 
jurisdiction, the test for corporate habitual residence is aimed at selecting only the state or states (a 
corporation, like an individual, can have more than one habitual residence) in which the corporation is in 
some sense based.74 The criteria have been the same throughout the Hague projects since the 1999 draft.75 
                                                      
66  February 2017 Hague draft, supra note 19, art 5(1)(p). This jurisdictional ground was not in the 2016 draft.  
67  CJPTA (BC), supra note 1, s 3(c).  
68  CJPTA (BC), supra note 1, s 3(d).  
69  February 2017 Hague draft, supra note 19, art 5(1)(a).  
70  1999 Hague draft, supra note 11, art 3(1).  
71  Ibid, art 18(2)(d).  
72  2001 Hague draft, supra note 12, art 3(1).  
73  Ibid, art 3(2). Art 3(2)(b)(ii) would have allowed the defendant to be resident in multiple states if there was no 
principal residence.  
74  Compare the criterion used of the corporation’s being “at home”, which the US Supreme Court has adopted as 
the basis for general jurisdiction as against a corporation: Daimler AG v Bauman, 134 S Ct 746 (2014); 
Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations SA v Brown, 564 US 915, 131 S Ct 2846 (2011); see Tanya Monestier, 
“Where Is Home Depot ‘At Home’?: Daimler v Bauman and the End of Doing Business Jurisdiction” (2014) 
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A corporation is habitually resident in a state if it has its statutory seat there, was incorporated there, had 
its central administration there, or had its principal place of business there.76 Only one of these, the place 
of central administration, is also used in the CJPTA.77 The CJPTA uses three other alternative criteria that 
would usually not make the corporation habitually resident in the Hague sense: being required by law to 
have a registered office in the province; having, pursuant to law, registered an address or an agent in the 
province for service of process; and having a place of business in the province.78   
The four Hague criteria apply not only to corporations but also to an “entity or person other than a natural 
person”, like unincorporated associations and partnerships.79 The CJPTA deals separately with them, 
again regarding them as ordinarily resident if, among other things, they have a place of business or, if 
they do not do business, a place where they conduct their activities in the province.80 They would not be 
habitually resident on the Hague test on that basis alone.  
The Hague model, again by analogy with individuals, treats jurisdiction as against a corporation or other 
entity that is not habitually resident in the state, but does have a presence there, as assumed jurisdiction. 
Under the February 2017 draft, if a defendant maintains a branch, agency or other establishment81 in the 
state of origin at the time the defendant becomes a party to the proceeding, there is jurisdiction if the 
claim on which the judgment is based arose out of the activities of that branch, agency or other 
establishment.82 This, of course, is the qualification that the Supreme Court of Canada refused, in the 
Chevron case, to add to jurisdiction based on a corporation’s presence in the province.83  
4.4 Assumed jurisdiction — presumed real and substantial connection  
From the point of view of the enforceability of an eventual judgment, the assumed jurisdiction grounds 
come into play only if the defendant does not submit to the jurisdiction. The CJPTA, following the 
Morguard principle, adopted the real and substantial connection as the sine qua non of assumed 
                                                                                                                                                                              
66 Hastings LJ 233. Because of the due process requirements for general jurisdiction, as applied in these cases, 
the American common law on this issue is much closer to the Hague model than the Canadian common law is.  
75  1999 Hague draft, supra note 11, art 3(2).  
76  February 2017 Hague draft, supra note 19, art 3(2).  
77  CJPTA (BC), supra note 1, s 7(d).  
78  Ibid, s 7(a), (b) and (c), respectively. Having a place of business in the province is judged on fairly flexible 
lines. Black et al, supra note 1 at 83 notes Borgstrom v Korean Air Lines Co Ltd, 2006 BCSC 1690, rev’d on 
other grounds 2007 BCCA 263, 70 BCLR (4th) 206, in which an airline was found to have a place of business 
in British Columbia because it flew airplanes regularly into Vancouver and had ten employees posted there to 
handle the planes.  
79  February 2017 Hague draft, supra note 19, art 3(2). 
80  Ibid, s 8-9.  
81  February 2017 Hague draft, supra note 19, art 5(1)(d) stipulates that the branch, etc., must be “without separate 
legal personality”. The use of jurisdiction over subsidiaries to get at parent companies was an issue in 2001: 
see 2001 Hague draft, supra note 12, art 9 and the footnotes to it.  
82  February 2017 Hague draft, ibid, art 5(1)(d).  
83  But it is included in the Civil Code of Québec: art 3148(2).  
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jurisdiction.84 The overwhelming majority of cases are taken care of by the listed categories of presumed 
real and substantial connection.85 Of the twelve paragraphs of the list, four deal with subject matter that is 
largely or entirely excluded from the scope of the February 2017 Hague draft, and was also excluded from 
the drafts of the 1999 and 2001 mixed convention drafts.86  
A fifth paragraph, which presumes there to be a real and substantial connection if the proceeding is for the 
enforcement of a judgment or arbitral award from outside the province,87 does not feature in the February 
2017 Hague draft because the latter is confined to enforcing judgments in the sense of a decision on the 
merits,88 not judgments that enforce other judgments or awards. Jurisdiction in foreign judgment 
proceedings was touched on in the mixed convention drafts, not by specifying when a court had 
jurisdiction in such proceedings — that was left by silence to national law — but by stipulating in the 
“black list” of prohibited grounds that a judgment creditor’s bringing such a proceeding in a state would 
not give that state’s court jurisdiction in a matter not directly related to the enforcement proceeding.89  
I will review the remaining seven paragraphs briefly, indicating how far the jurisdictional bases will fit 
the criteria in the February 2017 Hague draft.  
4.4.1 Rights in property in the province  
Sometimes Hague compliant. The CJPTA gives territorial competence against a non-resident defendant 
if the proceeding “is brought to enforce, assert, declare or determine proprietary or possessory rights or a 
security interest in property in British Columbia that is movable or immovable”.90 The February 2017 
Hague draft recognizes no jurisdiction based on the claim having to do with rights in movable property 
situated within the state.91 There are two provisions relating to claims to rights in immovables. One 
recognizes jurisdiction if a judgment rules on a tenancy of immovable property in the state of origin.92 
The other is the provision, already referred to,93 that gives the court of the situs exclusive jurisdiction to 
                                                      
84  CJPTA (BC), supra note 1, s 3(e).  
85  Ibid, s 10.  
86  The four are CJPTA (BC), ibid, s 10(b) and (c), which are concerned with matters of succession (though (c) 
may apply to some inter vivos transactions); s 10(j), on status and capacity of a natural person; and s 10(l) on 
recovery of taxes.  
87  CJPTA (BC), ibid, s 10(k).  
88  February 2017 Hague draft, supra note 19, art 3(1)(b).  
89  1999 Hague draft, supra note 11, art 18(2)(h); compare 2001 Hague draft, supra note 12, where two versions 
are proposed.  
90  CJPTA (BC), supra note 1, s 10(a).  
91  So the jurisdiction in Tucows.com Co v Lojas Renner SA, 2011 ONCA 548, 336 DLR (4th) 443. leave to 
appeal to SCC refused, 34481 (24 May 2012), would not be recognized (entitlement to domain name regarded 
as movable property in Ontario).  
92  February 2017 Hague draft, supra note 19, art 5(1)(h).  
93  Supra note 33.  
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rule on rights in rem in immovable property.94 The CJPTA’s “proprietary or possessory rights” in an 
immovable would cover claims to in rem rights and tenancies, as would claims to a security interest in an 
immovable that amounts to an right in rem because it is an interest in the land.95 There may be some types 
of security interests in immovables that are within the CJPTA presumption but outside the Hague criteria 
because they are not rights in rem.  
4.4.2 Trusts 
Sometimes Hague compliant. Both the CJPTA and the February 2017 Hague draft have fairly elaborate 
provisions about jurisdiction relating to trusts. They overlap but do not coincide. The Hague provision is 
limited to trusts “created voluntarily and evidenced in writing”,96 whereas the CJPTA paragraph applies to 
any trust, including one imposed by law or created orally.   
To take the four CJPTA grounds in turn, the first is that relief against a trustee (wherever resident) is 
claimed only as to trust assets, whether movable or immovable, in the province.97 This is not a ground 
under the February 2017 Hague draft. The second is that the trustee is ordinarily resident in the 
province.98 This would be covered, I think, by the general February 2017 Hague draft provision that “the 
person against whom recognition or enforcement is sought was habitually resident” in the state of 
origin.99 The third is that the administration of the trust is principally carried on in the province.100 This 
would usually correspond to the Hague criterion that the trust instrument expressly or impliedly 
designates the state of origin as the state in which the principal place of administration of the trust is 
situated.101 The Hague provision refers to where the principal administration should take place according 
to the trust document, whereas the CJPTA one refers to where it actually takes place. The fourth CJPTA 
ground is that by the express terms of a trust document, the trust is governed by the law of the province.102 
The corresponding Hague ground is actually wider, because it recognizes jurisdiction if the law of the 
state of origin was expressly or impliedly designated as the governing law.103 It is also more precise, 
because it caters to trusts governed by more than one law. It refers to the law designated as governing the 
                                                      
94  February 2017 Hague draft, supra note 19,  art 6(b).  
95  Like the mortgages in Hogg v Provincial Tax Commission, [1941] 3 WWR 605 (Sask CA).  
96  February 2017 Hague draft, supra note 19, art 5(1)(n).  
97  CJPTA (BC), supra note 1, s 10(d)(i).  
98  Ibid,  s 10(d)(ii).  
99  February 2017 Hague draft, supra note 19, art 5(1)(a).  
100  CJPTA (BC), supra note 1, s 10(d)(iii).  
101  February 2017 Hague draft, supra note 19, art 5(1)(n)(iii).  
102  CJPTA (BC), supra note 1, s 10(d)(iv).  
103  February 2017 Hague draft, supra note 19, art 5(1)(n)(ii). A bracketed proviso, which was not present in the 
2016 draft, would not recognize the governing law as a basis of jurisdiction if the defendant’s activities in 
relation to the trust “clearly did not constitute a purposeful and substantial connection to that State”, another 
instance of American due process concerns about basing jurisdiction purely on abstract legal connections; 
compare supra note 40 (law governing an IP right); infra note 116 and accompanying text (place of 
performance of contract).  
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aspect of the trust that is the subject of the litigation, whereas the CJPTA refers only to the law designated 
as governing the trust as a whole.  
In one of the rare instances of the Hague jurisdictional criteria covering a situation the CJPTA 
presumptions do not cover, the February 2017 Hague draft recognizes a judgment if the state of origin 
was designated in the trust instrument as a state (not necessarily the only state) in which disputes about 
such matters are to be determined.104 Even though this exact ground is not in the CJPTA, in almost every 
case where a trust did say that disputes about the trust could be litigated in the province, it seems more 
than likely that one or other of the existing CJPTA presumptions would give territorial competence (place 
of administration, express choice of governing law, etc.).105  
The 1999 Hague draft had one other ground relating to trusts, which was that a court would have 
jurisdiction if the trust had its closest connection with the forum state.106 The 2001 version expanded this 
by adding some factors to be taken into account in determining the closest connection.107 It also added a 
further jurisdictional ground, which was that the settlor, if living, and all living beneficiaries were all 
habitually resident in the forum state.108  
4.4.3 Contractual obligations 
Sometimes Hague compliant. The CJPTA has only two general jurisdictional presumptions relating to 
contractual obligations.109 Territorial competence exists if the contractual obligations with which the 
proceeding is concerned were, to a substantial extent, to be performed in the province.110 It also exists if, 
by its express terms, the contract is governed by the law of the province.111 There is a third presumption 
relating specifically to consumer contracts, meaning contracts for the purchase of property or services for 
use other than in the course of the purchaser’s trade or profession.112 Territorial competence is presumed 
to exist if the contract resulted from a solicitation of business in the province on behalf of the seller.113  
                                                      
104  Ibid, art 5(1)(n)(i).  
105  And there is always the “residual” real and substantial connection if there is an express choice of a forum in the 
province for trust disputes, but none of the existing presumptions applies.  
106  1999 Hague draft, supra note 11, art 11(2)(c).  
107  2001 Hague draft, supra note 12, art 11(2)(c).  
108  Ibid, art 11(2)(d).  
109  Saskatchewan has a third, namely, that the contract was made in Saskatchewan: CJPTA (SK), supra note 1, s 
9(d)(ii). This may be because the Saskatchewan version of the act followed an earlier ULCC draft than the 
final one; see Black et al, supra note 1 at 35-36. The place of contracting has (unfortunately, in my view) 
attracted the Supreme Court of Canada, which declared it to be a presumptive connecting factor even in tort 
cases, if the tort was connected with the contract: Club Resorts, supra note 46; Lapointe, supra note 48. The 
place of signing a contract was on the “black list” in the 1999 Hague draft, supra note 11, art 18(1)(j).  
110  CJPTA (BC), supra note 1, s 10(e)(i).  
111  Ibid,  s 10(e)(ii).  
112  Ibid,  s 10(e)(iii)(A).  
113  Ibid, s 10(e)(iii)(B).  
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The February 2017 Hague draft also recognizes jurisdiction based on where a contract was or should have 
been performed, but without the “to a substantial extent” qualification. Performance of the obligation in 
issue must have taken place, or ought to have taken place, in the forum state.114 The draft does, however, 
add another qualification, unusual in that it savours of American law and is probably directed at due 
process concerns.115 The fact that the forum state was the place of performance does not give jurisdiction 
if “the defendant’s activities in relation to the transaction clearly did not constitute a purposeful and 
substantial connection to that state”.116 This wording was in the Working Group’s draft; the group 
suggested that the use of “purposeful” might need further elaboration and discussion by the Special 
Commission,117 but the latter left the wording alone.118 The 1999 and 2001 drafts were quite different. The 
first had a rule based strictly on the place of performance.119 The second had added an alternative version 
based on the contract being “directly related” to “frequent [and] [or] significant activity” in the state.120 
Whether to include “activity jurisdiction” was one of the main sticking-points in the 2000-01 
negotiations.  
Assumed jurisdiction based on the contract’s being governed by the law of the state of origin does not 
exist under the February 2017 Hague draft.  
It is worth noting that there is a specific provision, in brackets, that could have been designed for the 
Morguard case; the court had jurisdiction if the judgment ruled on a contractual obligation secured by a 
right in rem in immovable property in the state, if the claim was brought together with a claim relating to 
that right.121  
The February 2017 draft provides that assumed jurisdiction based on the place of performance does not 
exist if the person sought to be bound is a consumer or an employee.122 This is one of only two places in 
which the 2016 draft deals with the special jurisdictional problems relating to contract actions brought 
against consumers and employees.123 The 1999 draft, no doubt influenced by the Brussels model, had 
special jurisdictional rules for both categories of contract, dealing with actions brought by, as well as 
against, the consumer or employee.124 The 2001 draft reflected acute controversies about the consumer 
                                                      
114  February 2017 Hague draft, supra note 19, art 5(1)(g).  
115  See supra note 13.  
116  Ibid.  
117  April 2016 Explanatory Note, supra note  para 96.  
118  And deployed it in other provisions, though not always using “purposeful”. See supra notes 40 and 103.   
119  1999 Hague draft, supra note 11,  art 6.  
120  2001 Hague draft, supra note 12, art 6, Alternative A. Two variant paragraphs would have elaborated on what 
“activity” meant.  
121  February 2017 Hague draft, supra note 19, art 5(1)(i).  
122  Ibid, art 5(2)(b).   
123  For the other, see supra note 59 and accompanying text.  
124  1999 Hague draft, supra note 11, art 7-8.  
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provisions; there were now multiple alternative and variant proposals. Commission II had not got to the 
employment provisions.125  
4.4.4 Restitutionary obligations 
Never Hague compliant. The February 2017 Hague draft has no provision recognizing jurisdiction based 
on the place where restitutionary obligations arose, that would analogous to the presumption in the 
CJPTA.126 There is a jurisdictional principle based on where a non-contractual obligation arose,127 but that 
provision, discussed immediately below, is limited to claims for physical injury. The mixed convention 
drafts did not have a provision for restitutionary claims, either.  
4.4.5 Tort 
Sometimes Hague compliant. The CJPTA presumes territorial competence, based on a real and 
substantial connection, if the proceeding concerns a tort committed in the province. Canadian law has 
been especially liberal when it comes to assumed jurisdiction in tort claims. The locus of the tort, for 
jurisdictional purposes, can be in any place that was substantially affected by the defendant’s activities or 
its consequences, the law of which is likely to have been in the reasonable contemplation of the parties.128 
In Club Resorts129 and Lapointe,130 the Supreme Court of Canada went beyond the CJPTA when it held 
that jurisdiction in a tort claim could be based, not on where the tort was committed, but on the place of 
making of a contract with which the tort was connected, the notion of “connection” being a flexible one.  
The February 2017 Hague draft, by sharp contrast, is very conservative when it comes to assumed 
jurisdiction in tort claims. It eschews economic claims altogether, thus cutting out (among others) almost 
all negligent or fraudulent misrepresentation claims, the locus of which, for jurisdictional purposes, is 
often litigated in Canada.131 (The exclusion of defamation claims, another fertile source of jurisdictional 
disputes in Canadian courts, was referred to earlier.132) It also settles firmly on a place of acting test. The 
rule recognizes only judgments based on a “non-contractual obligation arising from death, physical 
injury, damage to or loss of tangible property, [if] the act or omission directly causing such harm occurred 
in the state of origin, irrespective of where that harm occurred”.133 By this test, default judgments based 
                                                      
125  2001 Hague draft, supra note 12, art 7-8.  
126  CJPTA (BC), supra note 1, s 10(f).  
127  February 2017 Hague draft, supra note 19, art 5(1)(j).  
128  Moran v Pyle National (Canada) Ltd., [1975] 1 SCR 393 at 408-09.  
129  Club Resorts, supra note 46. 
130  Lapointe, supra note 48.  
131  Eg Central Sun Mining Inc v Vector Engineering Inc, 2013 ONCA 601, 117 OR (3d) 313, leave to appeal to 
SCC refused, 35640 (13 March 2014).  
132  Supra note 31 and accompanying text.  
133  February 2017 Hague draft, supra note 19, art 5(1)(j).  
 19 
 
on the jurisdictional grounds approved in many of the leading Canadian cases, including Moran v Pyle134 
and Club Resorts,135 would not have been enforceable under the Hague provision.  
The 1999 Hague draft, for the mixed convention, was much closer to the Canadian position. It would have 
included in the “white list” of required jurisdictional grounds a tort claim where the act or omission 
occurred in the state, or where the injury arose in the state, unless the defendant can show that it could not 
reasonably have foreseen that the act or omission could result in an injury of that nature in that state.136 
The 2001 draft included another provision, bracketed, that parallels the activity-based ground proposed 
for jurisdiction in contract claims.137 Jurisdiction could be based on the defendant’s having “engaged in 
frequent or significant activity” in the forum state if the tort claim arose out of that activity.138 
4.4.6 Business carried on 
Sometimes Hague compliant. The CJPTA presumes territorial competence if the proceeding concerns a 
business carried on in the province.139 This ground is not often needed when it comes to suing a 
corporation, because the CJPTA’s tests for the ordinary residence of a corporation include the fact that the 
corporation had a place of business in the province. So this presumption comes into play only if the claim 
concerns a business carried on in the province by a corporation that does not have a “place” of business 
there and is not otherwise ordinarily resident there, or a business carried on by an individual who is 
ordinarily resident elsewhere. The February 2017 Hague draft does not recognize jurisdiction on the basis 
of a corporation’s doing business other than through a branch, agency or other establishment.140 It does 
have a provision for jurisdiction based on a natural person’s having his or her principal place of business 
(not just a place of business) in the forum state, if the claim arose out of the business done there.141  
4.4.7 Injunction  
Never Hague compliant. The CJPTA presumes there to be a real and substantial connection if the 
plaintiff claims an injunction ordering a party to do or refrain from doing anything in the province, or in 
relation to immovable or movable property in the province.142 The February 2017 Hague draft has no 
                                                      
134  Supra note 128.  
135  Club Resorts, supra note 46. In neither of the two cases decided in Club Resorts was jurisdiction taken based 
on the tort having been committed in Ontario, and so they would not have fitted under the CJPTA presumption. 
They could have been cases where a “residual” real and substantial connection might be shown.  
136  1999 Hague draft, supra note 11, art 10(1).  
137  See supra note 120 and accompanying text.  
138  2001 Hague draft, supra note 12, art 10(2). The provision would also have required that “the overall 
connection of the defendant to that state makes it reasonable that the defendant be subject to suit in that state”. 
139  CJPTA (BC), supra note 1, s 10(h).  
140  See supra note 82 and accompanying text.  
141  February 2017 Hague draft, supra note 19, art 5(1)(b).  
142  CJPTA (BC), supra note 1, s 10(i).  
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corresponding ground.143 The 1999 and 2001 mixed convention drafts dealt with jurisdiction to issue 
injunctions only as provisional or protective measures.144  
4.5 Assumed jurisdiction — residual real and substantial connection 
Using the February 2017 Hague draft as the basis for comparison, there would be very few Hague 
compliant bases of jurisdiction that would lie outside one or other of the CJPTA’s listed presumptions and 
so could be applied on the basis of a residual (affirmatively shown) real and substantial connection. These 
would include most of the jurisdictional grounds relating to IP rights  that are based solely on the law 
governing the right.145 It would be rare, though not impossible, for such claims to find their way into the 
court of a province as distinct from the Federal Court, and so the CJPTA would practically never be 
involved.146 
4.6 Assumed jurisdiction — forum of necessity 
None of the Hague drafts included the concept of forum of necessity, which is understandable, given that 
it is controversial even within a legal system like Canada’s. A judgment based on the CJPTA forum of 
necessity provision147 would not be Hague compliant.  
5. DECLINING JURISDICTION  
5.1 Forum non conveniens 
It is worth noting briefly the extent to which the CJPTA’s forum non conveniens provisions148 fit into the 
Hague discussions. For obvious reasons the February 2017 Hague draft, which is concerned only with 
recognition and enforcement of judgments, does not touch on declining jurisdiction. The discretion to 
decline jurisdiction is generally not a significant part of the jurisdictional system in civil law countries, 
and does not form part of the Brussels system. Nevertheless it was included in the 1999 Hague draft for 
the mixed convention. That draft convention would have permitted a court in a contracting state, in 
“exceptional circumstances”, to suspend its proceedings if it was “clearly inappropriate” for the court to 
                                                      
143  Injunctions are within the range of judgments recognized or enforced under the proposed convention. It 
includes a “decree or order” within the scope of “judgment”: February 2017 Hague draft, supra note 19, art 
3(1)(b). The injunction would have to be a permanent one, given after a decision on the merits; the same 
provision states that interim measures of protection are not included.  
144  See 1999 Hague draft, supra note 11, art 13. In the 2001 Hague draft, supra note 12, opinion was divided on 
whether the convention should exclude provisional and protective measures from its scope altogether or, as the 
1999 draft had proposed. specifically provide for jurisdiction to order protective measures that have effect only 
within state of the court that orders them, and are designed to protect a claim on the merits. See art 1(2)(k) and 
art 13, Alternatives A and B. 
145  See February 2017 Hague draft, supra note 19, art 5(1)(k)-(m), all bracketed, dealing with judgments ruling on 
IP rights governed by the law of the state of origin. See supra notes 40 and 43.  
146  One cases where copyright infringement claims were brought against non-resident defendants, although in a 
non-CJPTA province, was Geophysical Service Inc v Arcis Seismic Solutions Corp, supra note 48.  
147  CJPTA (BC), supra note 1, s 6. The forum of necessity section was omitted in the CJPTA (SK), supra note 1; 
see Black et al, supra note 1 at 174-77.  
148  Ibid, s 11.  
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exercise jurisdiction and another state’s court was “clearly more appropriate to resolve the dispute”. If the 
other court took jurisdiction, the first court would then decline jurisdiction. 149 This provision survived 
almost intact into the 2001 draft.150 The references to “exceptional circumstances” and “clearly 
inappropriate” seems to make the standard for declining jurisdiction somewhat higher than the 
CJPTA’s.151 Even the alternative forum’s being “clearly more appropriate” is stricter than the CJPTA’s 
“more appropriate”,152 although the common law has sanctified the “clearly more appropriate” test and 
courts tend to equate the CJPTA test with it.153  
5.2 Parallel proceedings 
The CJPTA, like the common law, has no principle of lis alibi pendens. The forum non conveniens 
provisions of the CJPTA therefore apply to cases in which proceedings on the same matter between the 
same parties have been brought elsewhere, as the Supreme Court of Canada confirmed in the Teck case.154  
Because it only proposes a recognition and enforcement convention, the February 2017 Hague draft does 
not have to deal with lis alibi pendens. It does, however, have a provision permitting the requested state to 
refuse or postpone recognition or enforcement of a foreign judgment that is otherwise entitled to it, if 
proceedings between the same parties on the subject matter are pending before a court in that state, 
provided that the local court was seized before the court of origin and there is a close connection between 
the dispute and the requested state.155 The Permanent Bureau’s commentary notes that jurisdictions differ 
on whether a pending local proceeding is pre-empted by a foreign judgment that is entitled to 
recognition.156 Hence this provision is worded in permissive rather than mandatory terms.  
                                                      
149  1999 Hague draft, supra note 11, art 22.  
150  2001 Hague draft, supra note 12, art 22. See Ronald A Brand, “Comparative Forum Non Conveniens and the 
Hague Convention on Jurisdiction and Judgments” (2002), 37 Texas Int’l LJ 467.  
151  Black, supra note 11 at 260. The “clearly inappropriate” element has affinities with the Australian law on 
forum non conveniens; see Justin Paul Cook, “Declining Jurisdiction in The Hague’s Proposed Judgments 
Convention: Amalgamating the ‘More Appropriate Forum’ and the ‘Clearly Inappropriate Forum’ Tests to 
Provide the Optimal Forum Non Conveniens Clause” (2014) 21 Aust Int’l LJ 19.  
152  “More appropriate” is the standard in both s 11(1) and (2).  
153  See Club Resorts, supra note 46 at paras 108-109; Colonial Countertops Ltd v Maple Terrazzo Marble and 
Tile Inc, 2014 BCSC 752 at paras 25-29, [2014] 11 WWR 827.  
154  Teck Cominco Metals Ltd v Lloyd’s Underwriters, 2009 SCC 11, [2009] 1 SCR 321.  
155  February 2017 Hague draft, supra note 19, art 7(2). The Working Group’s draft also provided that recognition 
could be refused or postponed, even if the dispute were not closely connected with the requested state, if the 
proceedings before the court of origin were “brought for the purpose of frustrating the effectiveness of the 
pending proceedings”: Working Group draft, supra note 17, art 7(2)(b). The Special Commission deleted this 
part of article 7(2).  
156  April 2016 Explanatory Note, supra note 17, at para 171. In notes 81 and 82, Québec and Saskatchewan are 
listed as jurisdictions favouring the local proceeding whereas the other Canadian jurisdictions are listed as 
favouring recognition of the foreign judgment.  
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The 1999 draft for the mixed convention included a rule that the court second seized must suspend 
jurisdiction in favour of the court first seized,157 subject to two exceptions. One is where the action in the 
court first seized is for a determination that the plaintiff has no obligation to the defendant whereas the 
action in the other court seeks substantive relief; in that case the court first seized must suspend the 
proceedings.158 The other is where the court first seized, on application by a party, determines that the 
court second seized is clearly more appropriate to resolve the dispute.159 The article would not allow, as in 
Teck, the court second seized to refuse to decline jurisdiction because it itself is clearly the more 
appropriate forum. The article survived into the 2001 draft with only minor amendments.  
6. CONCLUSION 
The short answer to the question, whether the CJPTA’s rules will cause difficulty if a Hague Convention 
on foreign judgments comes into force along the lines of the February 2017 draft, is no. The CJPTA’s 
jurisdictional rules are in many respects wider than the jurisdictional grounds recognized in the Hague 
draft, but that would not prevent judgments from being recognized under the convention if the facts 
brought the judgment within the Hague grounds. If recognition and enforcement abroad is important to 
the parties, they can usually know in advance whether the judgment would be Hague compliant.  
There would be little reason to narrow the jurisdictional grounds in the CJPTA in an attempt to bring it 
closer to a Hague compliant jurisdictional system. There would be no real benefit in terms of certainty of 
operation of the CJPTA itself; the existing CJPTA seems to be working reasonably predictably. Nor 
would it gain wider acceptance for our judgments abroad, since the recognition and enforcement 
convention, like the common law, does not make jurisdiction depend on the ground on which the foreign 
court actually took jurisdiction but on whether the ground was present in fact. The cost of a disparity 
between the CJPTA jurisdictional system and a Hague system is that litigants who care about recognition 
or enforcement of a judgment elsewhere cannot rely on the CJPTA’s grounds as a guarantee that a 
judgment will be effective abroad. However, this is the present situation and, Hague or no Hague, we will 
almost certainly have to keep living with it.  
Two other considerations come into play as well. One, which relates to a point that was referred to 
earlier,160 is that the domestic jurisdictional grounds are structured as they are because they include a 
robust discretion to decline jurisdiction on the basis of forum non conveniens. To recast the grounds along 
the lines of the grounds in the Hague judgments convention would ignore this fundamental structural 
feature. The other consideration is that one of the main roles of the CJPTA is to define jurisdiction vis-à-
vis other provinces. This the CJPTA does, following in a reasonable way the constitutional limits on 
jurisdiction — fairly conservatively interpreted, as it now turns out. To narrow the CJPTA jurisdictional 
grounds under the influence of a Hague Convention would therefore, in a sense, put the international cart 
before the interprovincial horse.161  
                                                      
157  1999 Hague draft, supra note 11, art 21(1). The court first seised must be “expected to render a judgment 
capable of being recognized” under the convention.  
158  Ibid, art 21(6).  
159  Ibid, art 21(7).  
160  Supra note 44 and accompanying text.  
161  The international cart may also eventually take more than one form. Since 2005 the Commonwealth Law 
Ministers have been developing a Model Law for the recognition of judgments among the Commonwealth 
nations. The Ministers considered a draft in 2014: see Meeting of Commonwealth Law Ministers and Senior 
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It is hard to imagine any scenario in which the Hague system and the common law jurisdictional systems 
of which the CJPTA is part will be brought close enough together to allow them to merge into one 
dovetailed whole. Even if a Hague Convention on jurisdiction, separate from the recognition and 
enforcement of judgments convention currently being negotiated, comes to pass it will almost certainly 
leave states free to use jurisdictional grounds that do not comply with the “white list” in the convention. 
There may or may not be an agreed “black list” of prohibited grounds of jurisdiction. Even if the black list 
in the 1999 Hague draft162 were to be replicated in a new convention, it would not ban any of the grounds 
of assumed jurisdiction listed as presumed real and substantial connections in the CJPTA.163 It is possible 
that such a convention could require some adjustments, probably not radical ones, to forum non 
conveniens and lis alibi pendens rules. Very probably, therefore, the CJPTA could function perfectly well 
even if Canada became a party to an eventual Hague jurisdiction convention.  
Disparities between the CJPTA and the Hague system, whatever it may become, seem to me less of a 
concern than the growing disparities, as a result of the evolution of the common law, between the CJPTA 
and non-CJPTA systems within Canada. The Supreme Court of Canada’s desire, as expressed in Club 
Resorts,164 to harmonize the two as far as possible seems to have faded,165 to the detriment of the 
Canadian jurisdictional system as a whole.  
                                                                                                                                                                              
Officials, Final Communiqué (5-8 May 2014), online: Commonwealth 
<http://thecommonwealth.org/media/news/communique-commonwealth-law-ministers-meeting-2014>. 
Further work is proceeding. The drafters have drawn on both the Hague model and the work of 
Commonwealth law reform agencies (ibid, para 9).  
162  Supra note 11, art 18(2).  
163  Except Saskatchewan’s presumption based on the place a contract is made; see supra note 109.  
164  Supra note 46.  
165  As evidenced most notably in the Lapointe case, supra note 48, expanding considerably a presumptive 
jurisdictional ground (the place of making of a contract) that was deliberately omitted in the CJPTA.  
CJPTA and the Hague projects (Appendix) — page 24  
24 
 
Appendix 
 
Hague Conference on Private International Law 
Special Commission on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments 
 
February 2017 Draft Convention (“February 2017 Hague Draft”) 
  
  
CHAPTER I – SCOPE AND DEFINITIONS  
  
Article 1  
Scope  
  
1. This Convention shall apply to the recognition and enforcement of 
judgments relating to civil or commercial matters. It shall not extend in 
particular to revenue, customs or administrative matters.   
  
2. This Convention shall apply to the recognition and enforcement in one 
Contracting State of a judgment given by a court of another Contracting 
State. 
  
  
Article 2  
Exclusions from scope  
  
1. This Convention shall not apply to the following matters –   
  
(a) the status and legal capacity of natural persons;   
(b) maintenance obligations;   
(c) other family law matters, including matrimonial property regimes and 
other rights or obligations arising out of marriage or similar 
relationships;   
(d) wills and succession;   
(e) insolvency, composition, resolution of financial institutions, and 
analogous matters;   
(f) the carriage of passengers and goods;  
(g) marine pollution, limitation of liability for maritime claims, general 
average, and emergency towage and salvage;  
(h) liability for nuclear damage;   
(i) the validity, nullity, or dissolution of legal persons or associations of 
natural or legal persons, and the validity of decisions of their organs;   
(j) the validity of entries in public registers;   
(k) defamation [and privacy].   
[(l) intellectual property rights[, except for copyright and related rights and 
registered and unregistered trademarks]]. 
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2. A judgment is not excluded from the scope of this Convention where 
a matter to which this Convention does not apply arose merely as a 
preliminary question in the proceedings in which the judgment was given, 
and not as an object of the proceedings. In particular, the mere fact that 
such a matter arose by way of defence does not exclude a judgment from 
the Convention, if that matter was not an object of the proceedings. 
  
3. This Convention shall not apply to arbitration and related 
proceedings.   
  
4. A judgment is not excluded from the scope of this Convention by the 
mere fact that a State, including a government, a governmental agency or 
any person acting for a State, was a party to the proceedings.   
  
5. Nothing in this Convention shall affect privileges and immunities of 
States or of international organisations, in respect of themselves and of their 
property.    
Article 3  
Definitions  
  
1. In this Convention –  
  
(a) “defendant” means a person against whom the claim or counterclaim 
was brought in the State of origin;  
(b) “judgment” means any decision on the merits given by a court, 
whatever it may be called, including a decree or order, and a 
determination of costs or expenses by the court (including an officer of 
the court), provided that the determination relates to a decision on the 
merits which may be recognised or enforced under this Convention. An 
interim measure of protection is not a judgment.  
2. An entity or person other than a natural person shall be considered to 
be habitually resident in the State –   
  
(a) where it has its statutory seat;   
(b) under whose law it was incorporated or formed;   
(c) where it has its central administration; or   
(d) where it has its principal place of business.  
  
  
  
CHAPTER II – RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT  
  
Article 4  
General provisions  
  
1. A judgment given by a court of a Contracting State (State of origin) 
shall be recognised and enforced in another Contracting State (requested 
State) in accordance with the provisions of this Chapter. Recognition or 
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enforcement may be refused only on the grounds specified in this 
Convention.   
  
2. Without prejudice to such review as is necessary for the application of 
the provisions of this Chapter, there shall be no review of the merits of the 
judgment given by the court of origin.   
  
3. A judgment shall be recognised only if it has effect in the State of 
origin, and shall be enforced only if it is enforceable in the State of origin.   
  
4. If a judgment referred to in paragraph 3 is the subject of review in 
the State of origin or if the time limit for seeking ordinary review has not 
expired, the court addressed may –  
  
(a) grant recognition or enforcement, which enforcement may be 
conditional on the provision of such security as it shall determine;   
(b) postpone the decision on recognition or enforcement; or  
(c) refuse the recognition or enforcement.   
  
A refusal under sub-paragraph (c) does not prevent a subsequent application 
for recognition or enforcement of the judgment.   
  
  
    
Article 5  
Bases for recognition and enforcement  
  
1. A judgment is eligible for recognition and enforcement if one of the 
following requirements is met –  
  
(a) the person against whom recognition or enforcement is sought was 
habitually resident in the State of origin at the time that person 
became a party to the proceedings in the court of origin; 
(b) the natural person against whom recognition or enforcement is sought 
had his or her principal place of business in the State of origin at the 
time that person became a party to the proceedings in the court of 
origin and the claim on which the judgment is based arose out of the 
activities of that business; 
(c) the person against whom recognition or enforcement is sought is the 
person that brought the claim, other than a counterclaim, on which the 
judgment is based; 
(d) the defendant maintained a branch, agency, or other establishment 
without separate legal personality in the State of origin at the time that 
person became a party to the proceedings in the court of origin, and 
the claim on which the judgment is based arose out of the activities of 
that branch, agency, or establishment;   
(e) the defendant expressly consented to the jurisdiction of the court of 
origin in the course of the proceedings in which the judgment was 
given;   
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(f) the defendant argued on the merits before the court of origin without 
contesting jurisdiction within the timeframe provided in the law of the 
State of origin, unless it is evident that an objection to jurisdiction or to 
the exercise of jurisdiction would not have succeeded under that law;  
(g) the judgment ruled on a contractual obligation and it was given in the 
State in which performance of that obligation took place, or should 
have taken place, in accordance with  
(i) the parties’ agreement, or  
(ii) the law applicable to the contract, in the absence of an agreed 
place of performance,  
unless the defendant's activities in relation to the transaction clearly 
did not constitute a purposeful and substantial connection to that 
State;  
(h) the judgment ruled on a tenancy of immovable property and it was 
given in the State in which the property is situated;  
(i) the judgment ruled against the defendant on a contractual obligation 
secured by a right in rem in immovable property located in the State of 
origin, if the contractual claim was brought together with a claim 
against the same defendant relating to that right in rem;  
(j) the judgment ruled on a non-contractual obligation arising from death, 
physical injury, damage to or loss of tangible property, and the act or 
omission directly causing such harm occurred in the State of origin, 
irrespective of where that harm occurred;  
[(k) the judgment ruled on an infringement of a patent, trademark, industrial 
design, plant breeder’s right, or similar right required to be granted or 
registered and it was given by a court in the State of origin in which 
the grant or registration of the right concerned has taken place, or is 
deemed to have taken place under the terms of an international or 
regional instrument[, unless the defendant has not acted in that State 
to initiate or further the infringement, or their activity cannot 
reasonably be seen as having been targeted at that State];]  
[(l) the judgment ruled on the ownership or subsistence of copyright or 
related rights, [or use-based trademarks, trade names, or unregistered 
designs] [or other intellectual property rights not required to be 
registered] and the right is governed by the law of the State of origin;] 
[(m) the judgment ruled on an infringement of copyright or related rights, 
[or use-based trademarks, trade names, or unregistered designs] [or 
other intellectual property rights not required to be registered] and the 
right is governed by the law of the State of origin, [unless the 
defendant has not acted in that State to initiate or further the 
infringement, or their activity cannot reasonably be seen as having 
been targeted at that State];] 
(n) the judgment concerns the validity, construction, effects, 
administration or variation of a trust created voluntarily and evidenced 
in writing, and –  
(i) at the time the proceedings were instituted, the State of origin 
was designated in the trust instrument as a State in which 
disputes about such matters are to be determined; 
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(ii) the law of the State of origin is expressly or impliedly designated 
in the trust instrument as the law governing the aspect of the 
trust that is the subject of the litigation that gave rise to the 
judgment[, unless the defendant’s activities in relation to the 
trust clearly did not constitute a purposeful and substantial 
connection to that State]; or  
(iii) at the time the proceedings were instituted, the State of origin 
was expressly or impliedly designated in the trust instrument as 
the State in which the principal place of administration of the 
trust is situated. designated in the trust instrument as a State in 
which disputes about such matters are to be determined;   
 This sub-paragraph only applies to judgments regarding internal 
aspects of a trust between persons who are or were within the trust 
relationship; 
(o) the judgment ruled on a counterclaim –  
(i) to the extent that it was in favour of the counterclaimant, 
provided that the counterclaim arose out of the same transaction 
or occurrence as the claim 
(ii) to the extent that it was against the counterclaimant, unless the 
law of the State of origin required the counterclaim to be filed in 
order to avoid preclusion;  
(p) the judgment was given by a court designated in an agreement 
concluded or documented in writing or by any other means of 
communication which renders information accessible so as to be usable 
for subsequent reference, other than an exclusive choice of court 
agreement.  
 For the purposes of this sub-paragraph, an “exclusive choice of court 
agreement” means an agreement concluded by two or more parties 
that designates, for the purpose of deciding disputes which have arisen 
or may arise in connection with a particular legal relationship, the 
courts of one State or one or more specific courts of one State to the 
exclusion of the jurisdiction of any other courts. 
  
2. If recognition or enforcement is sought against a natural person 
acting primarily for personal, family or household purposes (a consumer) in 
matters relating to a consumer contract, or against an employee in matters 
relating to the employee’s contract of employment –  
(a) paragraph 1(e) applies only if the consent was addressed to the court, 
orally or in writing;  
(b) paragraph 1(f), (g) and (p) do not apply.   
  
Article 6   
Exclusive bases for recognition and enforcement   
  
Notwithstanding Article 5 –   
  
[(a) a judgment that ruled on the registration or validity of a patent, 
trademark, industrial design, plant breeder’s right, or similar right 
CJPTA and the Hague projects (Appendix) — page 29  
29 
 
required to be granted or registered shall be recognised and enforced if 
and only if the State of origin is the State in which grant or registration 
has been applied for, has taken place, or is deemed to have been 
applied for or to have taken place under the terms of an international 
or regional instrument;]  
(b) a judgment that ruled on rights in rem in immovable property shall be 
recognised and enforced if and only if the property is situated in the 
State of origin;  
(c) a judgment that ruled on a tenancy of immovable property for a period 
of more than six months shall not be recognised and enforced if the 
property is not situated in the State of origin and the courts of the 
Contracting State in which it is situated have exclusive jurisdiction 
under the law of that State.   
  
  
Article 7   
Refusal of recognition or enforcement   
  
1. Recognition or enforcement may be refused if –   
  
(a) the document which instituted the proceedings or an equivalent 
document, including a statement of the essential elements of the claim 
–  
(i) was not notified to the defendant in sufficient time and in such a 
way as to enable him to arrange for his defence, unless the 
defendant entered an appearance and presented his case without 
contesting notification in the court of origin, provided that the law 
of the State of origin permitted notification to be contested; or  
(ii) was notified to the defendant in the requested State in a manner 
that is incompatible with fundamental principles of the requested 
State concerning service of documents;  
(b) the judgment was obtained by fraud;  
(c) recognition or enforcement would be manifestly incompatible with the 
public policy of the requested State, including situations where the 
specific proceedings leading to the judgment were incompatible with 
fundamental principles of procedural fairness of that State [and 
situations involving infringements of security or sovereignty of that 
State];  
(d) the proceedings in the court of origin were contrary to an agreement, 
or a designation in a trust instrument, under which the dispute in 
question was to be determined in a court other than the court of origin;  
(e) the judgment is inconsistent with a judgment given in the requested 
State in a dispute between the same parties; or  
(f) the judgment is inconsistent with an earlier judgment given in another 
State between the same parties on the same subject matter, provided 
that the earlier judgment fulfills the conditions necessary for its 
recognition in the requested State;  
[(g) the judgment ruled on an infringement of an intellectual property right, 
applying to that right a law other than the law governing that right.].  
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2. Recognition or enforcement may be refused or postponed if 
proceedings between the same parties on the same subject matter are 
pending before a court of the requested State, where –  
(a) the court of the requested State was seised before the court of origin; 
and  
(b) there is a close connection between the dispute and the requested 
State.  
A refusal under this paragraph does not prevent a subsequent application for 
recognition or enforcement of the judgment.  
  
  
Article 8  
Preliminary questions  
  
1. Where a matter to which this Convention does not apply, or a matter 
referred to in Article 6 on which a court other than the court referred to in 
that Article ruled arose as a preliminary question, the ruling on that question 
shall not be recognised or enforced under this Convention.    
 
2. Recognition or enforcement of a judgment may be refused if, and to 
the extent that, the judgment was based on a ruling on a matter to which 
this Convention does not apply, or on a matter referred to in Article 6 on 
which a court other than the court referred to in that Article ruled. 
3. However, in the case of a ruling on the validity of a right referred to 
in Article 6, paragraph (a), recognition or enforcement of a judgment may be 
postponed, or refused under the preceding paragraph, only where –  
(a) that ruling is inconsistent with a judgment or a decision of a competent 
authority on that matter given in the State referred to in Article 6, 
paragraph (a); or  
(b) proceedings concerning the validity of that right are pending in that 
State.  
A refusal under sub-paragraph (b) does not prevent a subsequent application 
for recognition or enforcement of the judgment.   
  
  
Article 9  
Equivalent effects  
 
A judgment recognised or enforceable under this Convention shall be given 
the same effect it has in the State of origin. If the judgment provides for 
relief that is not available under the law of the requested State, that relief 
shall, to the extent possible, be adapted to relief with effects equivalent to, 
but not going beyond, its effects under the law of the State of origin.  
 
 
Article 10  
Severability  
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Recognition or enforcement of a severable part of a judgment shall be 
granted where recognition or enforcement of that part is applied for, or only 
part of the judgment is capable of being recognised or enforced under this 
Convention.   
 
 
Article 11  
Damages  
  
1. Recognition or enforcement of a judgment may be refused if, and to 
the extent that, the judgment awards damages, including exemplary or 
punitive damages, that do not compensate a party for actual loss or harm 
suffered.  
  
2. The court addressed shall take into account whether and to what 
extent the damages awarded by the court of origin serve to cover costs and 
expenses relating to the proceedings.   
  
 
[Article 12  
Non-monetary remedies in intellectual property matters 
 
A judgment granting a remedy other than monetary damages in intellectual 
property matters shall not be enforced under this Convention.] 
 
 
Article 13  
Judicial settlements (transactions judiciaires)  
  
Judicial settlements (transactions judiciaires) which a court of a Contracting 
State has approved, or which have been concluded in the course of 
proceedings before a court of a Contracting State, and which are enforceable 
in the same manner as a judgment in the State of origin, shall be enforced 
under this Convention in the same manner as a judgment[, provided that 
such settlement is permissible under the law of the requested State]. 
  
  
Article 14  
Documents to be produced  
  
1. The party seeking recognition or applying for enforcement shall 
produce –   
(a) a complete and certified copy of the judgment;  
(b) if the judgment was given by default, the original or a certified copy of 
a document establishing that the document which instituted the 
proceedings or an equivalent document was notified to the defaulting 
party;  
(c) any documents necessary to establish that the judgment has effect or, 
where applicable, is enforceable in the State of origin;  
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(d) in the case referred to in Article 13, a certificate of a court of the State 
of origin that the judicial settlement or a part of it is enforceable in the 
same manner as a judgment in the State of origin.   
2. If the terms of the judgment do not permit the court addressed to 
verify whether the conditions of this Chapter have been complied with, 
that court may require any necessary documents.   
  
3. An application for recognition or enforcement may be accompanied by 
a document relating to the judgment, issued by a court (including an 
officer of the court) of the State of origin, in the form recommended 
and published by the Hague Conference on Private International Law.   
  
4. If the documents referred to in this Article are not in an official 
language of the requested State, they shall be accompanied by a 
certified translation into an official language, unless the law of the 
requested State provides otherwise.   
  
  
Article 15  
Procedure  
  
1. The procedure for recognition, declaration of enforceability or 
registration for enforcement, and the enforcement of the judgment, are 
governed by the law of the requested State unless this Convention provides 
otherwise. The court addressed shall act expeditiously.   
  
2. The court of the requested State shall not refuse the recognition or 
enforcement of a judgment under this Convention on the ground that 
recognition or enforcement should be sought in another State.  
  
  
[Article 16  
Costs of proceedings  
  
1. No security, bond or deposit, however described, shall be required 
from a party who in one Contracting State applies for enforcement of a 
judgment given in another Contracting State on the sole ground that such 
party is a foreign national or is not domiciled or resident in the State in 
which enforcement is sought.]  
  
2. An order for payment of costs and expenses of proceedings, made in 
a Contracting State against any person exempt from requirements as to 
security, bond, or deposit by virtue of paragraph 1 shall, on the application 
of the person entitled to the benefit of the order, be rendered enforceable in 
any other Contracting State.]  
 
 Article 17  
Recognition or enforcement under national law  
  
Subject to Article 6, this Convention does not prevent the recognition or 
enforcement of judgments under national law.   
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CHAPTER III – GENERAL CLAUSES 
 
Article 18 
Transitional provision 
 
This Convention shall apply to the recognition and enforcement of judgments 
if, at the time the proceedings were instituted in the State of origin, the 
Convention was in force in that State and in the requested State.  
 
 
[Article 19 
No legalisation 
 
All documents forwarded or delivered under this Convention shall be exempt 
from legalisation or any analogous formality, including an Apostille.]  
 
 
Article 20 
Declarations limiting recognition and enforcement 
 
A State may declare that its courts may refuse to recognise or enforce a 
judgment given by a court of another Contracting State if the parties were 
resident in the requested State, and the relationship of the parties and all 
other elements relevant to the dispute, other than the location of the court 
of origin, were connected only with the requested State.  
 
Article 21 
Declarations with respect to specific matters 
 
1. Where a State has a strong interest in not applying this Convention to 
a specific matter, that State may declare that it will not apply the Convention 
to that matter. The State making such a declaration shall ensure that the 
declaration is no broader than necessary and that the specific matter 
excluded is clearly and precisely defined.  
 
2. With regard to that matter, the Convention shall not apply –  
(a) in the Contracting State that made the declaration;  
(b) in other Contracting States, where recognition or enforcement of a 
judgment given in a Contracting State that made the declaration is 
sought.  
 
 
[Article 22 
Declarations with respect to common courts 
 
1. A Contracting State may declare that –  
(a) a court common to two or more States exercises jurisdiction over 
matters that come within the scope of this Convention; and  
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(b) such a court –  
(i) has only an appellate function; or  
(ii) has first instance and appellate functions.  
2. Judgments of a Contracting State include –  
(a) judgments given by a court referred to in paragraph 1(b)(i);  
(b) judgments given by a court referred to in paragraph 1(b)(ii) if all 
States referred to in paragraph 1(a) are parties to this Convention.  
3. If a court referred to in paragraph 1(b)(i) serves as a common court 
for States some of which are Contracting States and some of which are non-
Contracting States to this Convention, judgments given by such a court shall 
only be considered as judgments of a Contracting State if the proceedings at 
first instance were instituted in a Contracting State. 
4. In case of a judgment given by a court referred to in paragraph 
1(b)(ii) the reference to the State of origin in Articles 5 and 6 shall be 
deemed to refer to the entire territory over which that court had jurisdiction 
in relation to that judgment.]  
 
 
Article 23 
Uniform interpretation 
 
In the interpretation of this Convention, regard shall be had to its 
international character and to the need to promote uniformity in its 
application.  
 
 
Article 24 
Review of operation of the Convention 
 
The Secretary General of the Hague Conference on Private International Law 
shall at regular intervals make arrangements for –  
(a) review of the operation of this Convention, including any declarations; 
and  
(b) consideration of whether any amendments to this Convention are 
desirable.  
 
 
Article 25 
Non-unified legal systems 
 
1. In relation to a Contracting State in which two or more systems of 
law apply in different territorial units with regard to any matter dealt with in 
this Convention –  
(a) any reference to the law or procedure of a State shall be construed as 
referring, where appropriate, to the law or procedure in force in the 
relevant territorial unit;  
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(b) any reference to habitual residence in a State shall be construed as 
referring, where appropriate, to habitual residence in the relevant 
territorial unit;  
(c) any reference to the court or courts of a State shall be construed as 
referring, where appropriate, to the court or courts in the relevant 
territorial unit;  
(d) any reference to a connection with a State shall be construed as 
referring, where appropriate, to a connection with the relevant 
territorial unit.  
2. Notwithstanding the preceding paragraph, a Contracting State with 
two or more territorial units in which different systems of law apply shall not 
be bound to apply this Convention to situations which involve solely such 
different territorial units.  
3. A court in a territorial unit of a Contracting State with two or more 
territorial units in which different systems of law apply shall not be bound to 
recognise or enforce a judgment from another Contracting State solely 
because the judgment has been recognised or enforced in another territorial 
unit of the same Contracting State under this Convention.  
4. This Article shall not apply to a Regional Economic Integration 
Organisation.  
 
 
Article 26 
Relationship with other international instruments 
 
1. This Convention shall be interpreted so far as possible to be 
compatible with other treaties in force for Contracting States, whether 
concluded before or after this Convention. 
2. This Convention shall not affect the application by a Contracting State 
of a treaty that was concluded before this Convention entered into force for 
that Contracting State, if applying this Convention would be inconsistent with 
the obligations of that Contracting State to any non-Contracting State. This 
paragraph shall also apply to treaties that revise or replace a treaty 
concluded before this Convention entered into force for that Contracting 
State, except to the extent that the revision or replacement creates new 
inconsistencies with this Convention.  
3. This Convention shall not affect the application by a Contracting State 
of a treaty, whether concluded before or after this Convention, for the 
purposes of obtaining recognition or enforcement of a judgment given by a 
court of a Contracting State that is also a Party to that treaty. However, the 
judgment shall not be recognised or enforced to a lesser extent than under 
this Convention.  
4. This Convention shall not affect the application by a Contracting State 
of a treaty which, in relation to a specific matter, governs the recognition or 
enforcement of judgments, even if concluded after this Convention and even 
if all States concerned are Parties to this Convention. This paragraph shall 
apply only if the Contracting State has made a declaration in respect of the 
treaty under this paragraph. In the case of such a declaration and to the 
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extent that any inconsistencies exist between the above-mentioned treaty 
and this Convention, other Contracting States shall not be obliged to apply 
this Convention to a judgment which relates to that specific matter and 
which was rendered by a court of a Contracting State that made the 
declaration.  
5. This Convention shall not affect the application of the rules of a 
Regional Economic Integration Organisation that is a Party to this 
Convention, whether adopted before or after this Convention as concerns the 
recognition or enforcement of judgments as between Member States of the 
Regional Economic Integration Organisation.  
 
[Chapter IV, Final Clauses, is omitted.] 
  
 
